: The traditional Auftragstaktik (mission-type tactics)—which allowed subordinate commanders great flexibility—was strangled by Hitler's increasing micromanagement and the rise of radio communication, which gave high command a "tight leash" on tactical movements.
: Germany’s military was built for short, decisive "wars of movement." In 1942, they were forced into a war of attrition against the "industrial machines" of the US, UK, and USSR—a battle they simply could not win. Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 Death of the Wehrmacht :The German Campaigns of...
Despite these wins, Citino identifies several fatal flaws that led to the "death" of the Wehrmacht as an effective fighting force: Citino argues that the year 1942 was not
In his seminal work, Death of the Wehrmacht: The German Campaigns of 1942 , historian Robert M. Citino argues that the year 1942 was not just a turning point in World War II, but the final gasp of a centuries-old "German way of war". While 1941’s failure at Moscow hinted at the end, 1942 was when the traditional Prussian tactics of maneuver ( Bewegungskrieg ) finally collapsed under the weight of modern industrial warfare. The Illusion of Victory Citino reconstructs these campaigns to show how the
The year began with a series of staggering, yet deceptive, German successes. Citino reconstructs these campaigns to show how the Wehrmacht still possessed lethal operational excellence: